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ABSTRACT 
For the death penalty to be justified, it must be reserved for the worst of 
the worst.  In his 2011 study of Connecticut‟s death penalty system, however, 
John Donohue found that arbitrariness and discrimination are defining features.  
Donohue‟s finding that non-white defendants whose victims were white are six 
times more likely to receive the death penalty indicate that race is more a 
predictor of a death sentence than the egregiousness of the crime.  An analysis of 
capital sentencing outcomes in Maricopa County, Arizona reveals that the race of 
the victim is not related to the likelihood of receiving a death sentence, but the 
race of the defendant is.  Use of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), 
logistic regression, and an egregiousness calculation are employed to analyze 
capital sentencing trial outcomes in Maricopa County from 2009 through 2011.  
This triangulated approach is applied to test three theoretically-derived models − 
the Donohue model, the Illinois Commission model, and the Functional model.  
The findings indicate that during the given time period in Maricopa County, the 
race of the defendant was statistically significant in cases with low to mid-levels 
of egregiousness, but was no longer significant in the most egregious cases.  The 
results also reveal that the most egregious cases, typically indicated by the 
presence of a prior conviction and multiple victims, are nearly five times more 
likely to result in an outcome of death.  While the results of this study are 
suggestive only, because of the small sample size and the relatively brief duration 
of time studied, the conclusions presented aim to provoke further inquiry into 
states‟ death penalty systems to address Donohue‟s allegation of unconstitutional 
ii 
 
application nationwide.  Through a drastic reduction of death-eligibility factors, 
implementation of a transparent plea bargaining protocol in which the presence of 
certain aggravating factors preempts the possibility of a plea, and equal funding 
for prosecutor and defense offices, the death penalty in this country could begin to 
target the worst of the worst.    
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
In 1976, the Supreme Court ruled capital punishment constitutional if it 
was not carried out in an arbitrary and capricious manner.  Recent literature in the 
area, however, indicates that today‟s method of capital punishment is no less 
arbitrary than it was prior to 1976.  One of the major, debilitating findings that 
Stanford professor John Donohue made in his recent study on Connecticut‟s death 
penalty is that minority defendants who commit capital murder and whose victims 
are white are six times more likely to receive the death penalty than minority 
defendants whose victims are non-white.
1
  His main finding was that 
“arbitrariness and discrimination are defining features”2 of Connecticut‟s death 
penalty, which threatens to undermine the constitutionality of today‟s capital 
punishment jurisprudence that, ostensibly, was resolved in Gregg.
3
 
This thesis analyzes and evaluates capital punishment sentencing 
outcomes in Maricopa County, Arizona from 2009 through 2011.  Specifically, 
capital cases that went to trial during this time period are studied to determine if 
the cases that received a death sentence were more egregious than those that 
received a life imprisonment sentence.  The objective is to ascertain whether, as 
                                                 
1
 Donohue, John J. 2011. Capital Punishment in Connecticut, 1973-2007: A Comprehensive 
Evaluation From 4686 Murders to One Execution. http://works.bepress.com/john_donohue/87/ 
(last accessed March 18, 2012). 
2
 Id. quoting at 3. 
3
 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
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constitutionally required, those cases resulting in a death sentence are “the most 
deserving of execution.”4 
Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), logistic regression, and 
an egregiousness calculation, the “deathworthiness”5 of the defendants that 
received a death sentence will be considered.  Between 2009 and 2011, 34 capital 
cases went to trial and resulted in a jury verdict of guilty.  Of these, 22 resulted in 
a death sentence and 12 resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment.  To determine 
the egregiousness level of each case, elements of the cases are studied and 
compared to determine whether the cases resulting in a death sentence are the 
“worst of the worst.”6   
A triangulated methodology will permit comparison of specific elements 
of the 34 capital cases to determine if application of the death penalty in Maricopa 
County is subject to the pre-Furman
7
 concerns of arbitrary discretion.  
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 Pre-Furman, it is estimated that only 15% of death-eligible convictions 
received a death sentence.
8
  The Court in Furman concluded this level was so rare 
as to be arbitrary, and thereby unconstitutional.  In Connecticut, Donohue found 
the percentage of death-eligible executions which sustained a sentence of death to 
                                                 
4
 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, (2002), quoting at 319. 
 
5
Supra note 1, quoting at 2. 
6
 Id. quoting at 5. 
 
7
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. (1972). 
 
8
Baldus, David C., George G. Woodward, and Charles A. Pulaski, Jr. 1990.Equal Justice and the 
Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis. Boston: Northeastern University Press, quoting at 
80. 
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be 4.4% − two-thirds lower than Furman’s level leading up to the Court‟s 
moratorium.  In his New York Times article presenting Donohue‟s devastating 
findings, editorial writer Lincoln Caplan concluded that “this „freakishly‟ rare 
application − among the thousands of murder cases a year − is strong evidence 
that every state system is arbitrary and capricious.”9 
 Subsequent to Gregg10, the “Stewart-Stevens less-is-better approach”11 to 
capital punishment prevailed for just over a decade, in which it was believed that 
a narrowing of those defendants eligible for the death penalty was the solution to 
capricious sentencing.  Starting in the late 1980s and into the 1990s, however, a 
shift toward Justice White‟s “more is better” jurisprudence emerged, and states 
began expanding their statutes with respect to death-eligible offenses.  During this 
time, aggravating factors were added to states‟ statutes “like Christmas tree 
ornaments.”12  While the Court has shifted back toward the narrowing perspective 
with its recent decisions in Atkins v. Virginia
13
, Roper v. Simmons
14
, and Kennedy 
v. Louisiana
15
, the laws enumerating death-eligible factors from the 1990s are 
generally still on the books, today, resulting in what many scholars describe as a 
                                                 
9
 Caplan, Lincoln. 2012. The Random Horror of the Death Penalty. The New York Times. January 
7. Editorial. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/opinion/sunday/the-random-horror-of-the-death-
penalty.html (accessed January 21, 2012).  
10
 Supra note 3. 
11
 Liebman, James S. and Lawrence C. Marshall. 2006. Less is Better: Justice Stevens and the 
Narrowed Death Penalty. Fordham Law Review 74, 1607-1682, quoting at 1610. 
12
 Simon, Jonathan and Christina Spaulding. 1990. Tokens of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors in 
the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in The Killing State: Capital Punishment in Law, Politics, 
and Culture, ed. Austin Sarat, quoting at 82. 
13
 Supra note 4.  This case held that executing defendants found to be mentally retarded is 
unconstitutional. 
14
 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).  This case held that executing juvenile defendants is unconstitutional. 
15
 554 U.S. 407 (2008).  This case held that execution for the rape of a child is unconstitutional. 
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contradiction in the jurisprudence: with nearly every murder being death-eligible, 
unfettered discretion still looms overhead since there is no meaningful tapering in 
the statutes to leave only the worst of the worst for the ultimate punishment. 
 To test whether Donohue‟s finding that “arbitrariness and discrimination 
are defining features of [Connecticut‟s] capital punishment regime”16 are 
emblematic of Maricopa County, which has the 11
th 
highest rate of executions in 
the country
17
, the egregiousness of capital cases that went to trial are analyzed. 
C. POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
 In Furman18, Justice Stewart declared the death penalty cruel and unusual 
in the way that getting struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.
19
  Donohue‟s 
finding that being executed in Connecticut is as improbable as getting struck by 
lightning commands other states to examine their death penalty system.  Although 
a more comprehensive and longitudinal evaluation is desirable, this study presents 
initial suggestions for Maricopa County, which has, by far, the most inmates on 
death row in Arizona.
20
  Though not definitive, the conclusions presented here 
aim to provoke further inquiry into Maricopa County‟s death penalty system, as 
                                                 
16
 Supra note 2. 
17
 Clark County Prosecuting Attorney. The Death Penalty. http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/ 
death/death.htm (accessed March 4, 2012).This data is from 1976 through January 1, 2012.  
Arizona is tied with Louisiana at 11
th
 with 28 executions. 
18
 Supra note 7. 
19
 408 U.S. 238, (1972), quoting at 310. 
20
 Arizona Attorney General. 2012. Profiles of Arizona Death Row Inmates, by Kent E. Cattani.  
As of February 2012, Maricopa County had 73 inmates on death row.  The second highest was 
Pima County with 25 inmates.  
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well as those of other counties and states, to address Donohue‟s and Caplan‟s 
allegations of unconstitutional application nationwide.   
For the death penalty to be justified, it must be reserved for the worst of 
the worst.  Through a drastic reduction of death-eligibility factors, implementation 
of a transparent plea bargaining protocol in which the presence of certain 
aggravating factors preempts the possibility of a plea, and equal funding for 
prosecutor and defense offices, the death penalty in this country could begin to 
target the worst of the worst. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
Section II of this thesis begins with a discussion of key Supreme Court 
decisions in the area of death penalty constitutionality.  The two most important 
decisions, Furman v. Georgia
21
 and Gregg v. Georgia
22
 are presented, as well as 
opinions from the justices whose implications still affect death penalty 
jurisprudence today.  Part B addresses the alleged contradiction between the 
guided discretion requirement of Furman and the individualized sentencing 
requirement of Lockett
23
.  Also, Illinois‟ 2002 Commission on Capital 
Punishment
24
 which calls for a severe reduction of death-eligible criteria is 
reviewed.  Part C explores plea bargaining and its effect on the death penalty.  
Though plea bargaining is found to be a tool prosecutors employ to gain 
                                                 
21
 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
22
 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
23
 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
24
 Illinois Commission Report. 2002. Report of the Governor’s Commission on Capital 
Punishment, by George H. Ryan. http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/ 
index.html (last accessed January 7, 2012). 
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bargaining leverage in their case, the use of plea bargaining in capital cases 
confounds the purpose of capital punishment if one assumes  its purpose is to 
punish the worst of the worst.  Next, the issue of deathworthiness and the 
executable subject is considered, and the extent to which the death penalty system 
can permit such a determination.  Finally, Part E reviews the death penalty in 
Arizona and outlines the capital punishment statutes pertinent to this study.  
Section III introduces the contextual framework of the study, including the 
influence of John Donohue‟s major findings and the 2002 Illinois Capital 
Punishment Commission‟s recommendation of reducing states‟ aggravating 
factors list to five.  Part C of this section identifies the research hypotheses to be 
tested.  Three major models are tried: 1) Donohue‟s model predicting racial 
discrimination in sentencing; 2) the Illinois Commission model employing only 
five death-eligible factors; and 3) the Functional model which predicts that the 
worst of the worst, based upon egregiousness, receive the death penalty.   
Section IV details the methodology employed, including determination of 
the research design based on the theory and technique of QCA and its 
appropriateness for this research.  Part B of this section outlines the sources from 
which the data was obtained, and Part C discloses the conditions/variables 
involved in the research, as well as a raw truth table including data on all 34 cases 
in the sample.   
Thereafter, presentation of the data analysis and subsequent results is 
made in Section V, suggesting capital sentencing in Maricopa County has a 
7 
 
discriminative presence in low to mid-level egregiousness cases, but which is not 
seen in the most egregious cases.  The findings also suggest that the presence of 
particularly egregious elements of the crime, namely, multiple victims, a cruel 
manner of murder, and a prior conviction, are most likely to result in the jury 
returning with a sentence of death.  
Finally, Section VI makes closing remarks and considers the limitations of 
the work and recommendations for future research. 
II. BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
On August 11, 1967, 26 year old William Henry Furman, in the midst of a 
home invasion, murdered William Micke in Savannah, Georgia.  Furman alleged 
the murder was an accident and that while attempting to flee, he tripped and his 
gun accidentally fired.  In an alternate version told to police, Furman turned and 
blindly shot the weapon while fleeing.  No matter which account was true, 
Furman was eligible for the death penalty under Georgia‟s felony murder rule. 
 Furman was convicted and sentenced to death.  In appealing to the 
Supreme Court on the grounds that imposition of the death sentence was 
unconstitutional, Furman v. Georgia25, consolidated with Jackson v. Georgia, and 
Branch v. Texas, resulted in a four year moratorium on the death penalty in the 
United States.  In its per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held 5-4 that the 
death penalty violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the death 
                                                 
25
 Supra note 21. 
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penalty was applied in a discretionary and discriminatory manner.  In his opinion, 
Justice Brennan wrote:  
When there is a strong probability that the State is arbitrarily inflicting an 
unusually severe punishment that is subject to grave societal doubts, it is 
likely also that the punishment cannot be shown to be serving any penal 
purpose that could not be served equally well by some less severe 
punishment.
26
 
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, notably found that “these death 
sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is 
cruel and unusual” and concludes that “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that 
permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”27 
The dissenting opinions of Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and 
Rehnquist in Furman v. Georgia would become the majority holding in Gregg v. 
Georgia28 four years later.  In 1976, the Court by a 7-2 margin ruled that the 
death penalty was constitutional under carefully drafted statutes ensuring 
sentencing guidance.  This guidance took the form of a bifurcated sentencing 
scheme, with a guilt phase and a penalty phase.  In his majority opinion, Justice 
Stewart cited the Model Penal Code‟s conclusion that “it is within the realm of 
possibility to point to the main circumstances of aggravation and of mitigation 
that should be weighed and weighed against each other when they are presented 
                                                 
26
 Supra note 7, quoting at 300. 
27
 Id., quoting at 309-310. 
28
 Supra note 22. 
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in a concrete case.”29  Justice Stewart explained that “the basic concern of 
Furman centered on those defendants who were being condemned to death 
capriciously and arbitrarily… Left unguided, juries imposed the death sentence in 
a way that could only be called freakish.”  Justice Stewart concluded, “While the 
jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it must 
find and identify at least one statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a 
penalty of death.  In this way, the jury‟s discretion is channeled.”30  Justice 
White‟s concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, 
articulates a constitutional justification of the death penalty that still holds today: 
Petitioner‟s argument that there is an unconstitutional amount of discretion 
in the system which separates those suspects who receive the death 
penalty from those who receive life imprisonment, a lesser, penalty, or are 
acquitted or never charged, seems to be in final analysis an indictment of 
our entire system of justice.  Petitioner has argued, in effect that no matter 
how effective the death penalty may be as a punishment, government, 
created and run as it must be by humans, is inevitably incompetent to 
administer it.  This cannot be accepted as a proposition of constitutional 
law.
31
 
If one concedes Justice White‟s determination that the death penalty cannot be 
abolished simply because it is administered by humans, imperfections and all, one 
wonders how much imperfection the system can tolerate until it simply becomes 
unworkable. 
 
 
                                                 
29
 Supra note 3, quoting at 193 (emphasis in original), quoting Model Penal Code § 201.6, 
Comment 3, 71 (1959). 
30
 Supra note 3, quoting at 206-207. 
31
 Id., quoting at 225-226. 
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B. THE “LESS IS BETTER” JURISPRUDENCE 
“Modern death penalty jurisprudence is founded on a contradiction.”32  
The argument that the current death penalty system is something of a paradox is 
not new.  While Furman33 requires guided sentencing to avoid arbitrariness, 
Lockett v. Ohio
34
 and Woodson v. North Carolina
35
 require discretion on the part 
of the jury to consider the individuality of the defendant‟s case.  Liebman and 
Marshall consider the evolution of the Furman/Lockett incongruity over the years.  
Starting with Furman, Justices Stewart and White proffered contrasting solutions: 
Justice Stewart found the solution to capricious sentencing to be a narrowing of 
the class of offenders eligible for the death penalty, while Justice White‟s solution 
was that of proliferation, as he believed the death penalty was imposed too 
infrequently.  Shortly after joining the Court, Justice Stevens “placed himself 
squarely in Justice Stewart‟s less-is-better camp.”36 
The Stewarts-Stevens less-is-better approach prevailed for the next five 
years.  In 1976, mandatory sentencing was prohibited in Woodson
37
, in which the 
plurality opinion cited the potential for “jurors‟ unfettered ability to acquit first-
degree murderers”38 and thereby renewing capricious sentencing, not to mention 
mandatory sentencing‟s inability to account for “the possibility of compassionate 
                                                 
32
 Supra note 11, quoting at 1608. 
33 Supra note 21. 
34
 Supra note 23. 
35
 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
36
 Supra note 11, quoting at 1610. 
37
 Supra note 35. 
38
 Supra note 11, quoting at 1623. 
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or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind.”39  Two 
years later, the Court reiterated the significance of individualized sentencing in 
Lockett v. Ohio
40
, holding that the jury could consider any number of mitigating 
factors in its sentencing decision.   
In 1983, the Court outlined the narrowing requirement of aggravating 
factors to guide the sentencer based on “culpability rather than caprice”41 in Zant 
v. Stephens
42
.  In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens described a homicide 
pyramid
43
 in which “the consequences flowing to the perpetrator increase in 
severity as the cases proceed from the base to the apex, with the death penalty 
applying only to those few cases which are contained in the space just beneath the 
apex.”44   For Justice Stevens, then, the holdings of Furman and Lockett were not 
at odds with each other.  Once the jury establishes one or more statutory 
aggravating factors, thereby narrowing the class of individuals that are death-
eligible, they can then consider the individuality of the case.  Justice Scalia would 
later disagree with this rationale in his concurring opinion in Walton v. Arizona
45
, 
stating: 
One might have supposed that curtailing or eliminating discretion in the 
sentencing of capital defendants was not only consistent with Furman, but 
positively required by it - - as many of the States, of course, did suppose.  
But in Woodson and Lockett, it emerged that uniform treatment of 
                                                 
39
 Supra note 35, quoting at 305. 
40
 Supra note 23. 
41
 Sharon, Chelsea Creo. 2011. The “Most Deserving” of Death: The Narrowing Requirement and 
the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Law Review, 46, 223-251, quoting at 226. 
42
 462 U.S. 862 (1983). 
43
 See Homicide Pyramid, Appendix A. 
44
 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), quoting at 871. 
45
 497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
12 
 
offenders guilty of the same capital crime was not only not required by the 
Eighth Amendment, but was all but prohibited.
46
 
Liebman and Marshall take note of Justice White‟s concern with the trend 
of narrowing decisions in the late 1970s and early 1980s, particularly his worry 
that juries would “cast large numbers of potentially condemnable capital 
murderers out of the death chamber based on any mitigating factor any juror 
intuited in the case.”47  With Justice Stewart‟s retirement from the Court in 1981, 
however, the Court began its shift away from Justice Stevens‟ approach toward 
Justice White‟s more-is-better approach.  Specifically, a proliferation of guided 
discretion statutes served to keep the particularly egregious aspects of the 
defendant‟s crime in the jury‟s mind.  The shift became especially apparent in 
McCleskey v. Kemp
48
 where a 5-4 majority found that the death penalty is 
constitutional even in instances where racial disparities in sentencing are present 
because it is “an inevitable part of our justice system.”49 
While the more-is-better jurisprudence took command in the late 1980s 
and 1990s, Liebman and Marshal find a recent trend back toward the Stevens‟ 
view to what they describe as “today‟s incredibly shrinking death penalty.”50  
Other scholars in the field make the same observation, with Chelsea Sharon 
calling it the “illusory nature of the death penalty” and noting that “while the 
penalty is perceived to be broadly applied, it is in fact rarely imposed.”51  
                                                 
46
 Id., quoting at 662, emphasis in original. 
47
 Supra note 11, quoting at 1628. 
48
 481. U.S. 279 (1987). 
49
 Id., quoting at 279. 
50
 Supra note 11, quoting at 1612. 
51
 Supra note 41, quoting at 223. 
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Liebman and Marshall cite recent legislative activity as indicative of the 
narrowing trend, including the Court‟s decisions in Atkins52, Roper53, and 
Kennedy
54
, and the advent of capital study commissions calling for narrowed 
death-eligible criteria. 
Perhaps the most notable commission on the death penalty was former 
Illinois Governor Ryan‟s Report of the Commission on Capital Punishment in 
2002
55
.  Although Illinois abolished capital punishment in 2011, the 2002 report 
enumerated several recommendations to improve its capital punishment scheme.  
With regards to death eligibility, the report calls for substantial revisions to the 
factors that would make an offender eligible for the death penalty.  In a 
unanimous decision, the Commission made a startling recommendation of 
reducing the current list of 20 aggravating factors to five.  The Commission 
explained, “While Commission members believe that all murders are very serious, 
the death penalty should be reserved for only the most heinous of these crimes.”56  
The Commission came to this seemingly radical recommendation after 
conducting an analysis on capital cases in which the death penalty was imposed 
since 1977, and found that only around half of the twenty eligibility factors are 
relied upon in court opinions, and only a few are used regularly.  The Commission 
determined that the proliferation and broadening of Illinois‟ eligibility factors 
since the 1990s expanded the scope of the statute to the point where nearly every 
                                                 
52
 Supra note 4. 
53
 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). 
54
 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
55
 Supra note 24. 
56
 Id,. quoting at 65. 
14 
 
murder could be death-eligible, and this violated the requirement that the death 
penalty be reserved for the worst of the worst. 
Indeed, the current literature echoes the finding that although each state 
requires certain aggravating factors to be found, “the number and breadth of these 
aggravating factors have been expanded over the last few decades with most 
states listing more than ten factors, such that more than 90% of murderers are 
death eligible in many states.”57 Sharon‟s 2011 article on the narrowing 
requirement of the death penalty argues that “the proliferation of aggravating 
factors in state death penalty statutes violates the narrowing requirement set forth 
in Zant and constitutes a wholesale retreat from the principles of Furman.”58  As a 
reason for the proliferation of aggravating factors in many states in the 1990s, 
Sharon cites “political exigency” rather than “careful efforts to identify those who 
are most culpable.”59 
The five eligibility factors the Illinois Commission recommends be 
retained include: 1) The murder of a peace officer or firefighter killed in the 
performance of his/her duties; 2) The murder of any person occurring at a 
correctional facility; 3) The murder of two or more persons; 4) The intentional 
murder of a person involving the infliction of torture; and 5) The murder by a 
person who is under investigation for/charged with/convicted of a felony of 
anyone involved in the investigation.  The Commission concluded that reducing 
Illinois‟ list of death eligibility factors to the aforementioned would effectively 
                                                 
57
 Supra note 41, quoting at 224. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. quoting at 232. 
15 
 
narrow the class of individuals who are deemed “death worthy” and retain capital 
punishment for “the most heinous of homicides.”60  Sharon agrees: 
Given the small death-sentence rates that adhere in most states, the only 
way to ensure the consistent treatment required by Furman is to drastically 
confine death eligibility to a small group of extremely heinous offenders 
whom jurors will sentence to death a substantial portion of the time.
61
 
Although the significance of the narrowing requirement cannot be overstated, 
Sharon going so far as to argue it is “the only barrier to unfettered discretion”62, 
most states with capital punishment have not implemented Illinois‟ sentencing 
recommendation, with “more than 90% of murderers death eligible in many 
states.”63 
C. CHARGING DECISIONS AND PLEA BARGAINING 
 Of the 145 capital cases in Maricopa County from January 2009 through 
December 2011, 80 resulted in a plea bargain.  To what extent does prosecutor‟s 
discretion in charging and plea bargaining decisions affect the constitutionality of 
the death penalty?  The petitioner in Gregg v. Georgia
64
 argued that “the state 
prosecutor has unfettered authority to select those persons whom he wishes to 
prosecute for a capital offense and plea bargain with them.”65  Justice White was 
quick to admonish the defendant for this allegation, though, rebuking:  
Petitioner simply asserts that since prosecutors have the power not to 
charge capital felonies they will exercise that power in a standardless 
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fashion.  This is untenable.  Absent the facts to the contrary, it cannot be 
assumed that prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decision by 
factors other than the strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury 
would impose the death penalty if it convicts.
66
 
How legitimate is Gregg‟s assertion of unfettered prosecutorial discretion – and 
how would we know, given the fact that “plea bargaining is hidden from public 
view”?67  If, as Donohue argues, juries exercise caprice and discrimination in its 
sentencing, could not prosecutors do the same in charging and plea bargaining? 
 In examining the administration of the death penalty, it is important to 
acknowledge the role that prosecutors play.  From charging decisions to plea 
bargaining, prosecutors have considerable discretion, and thus power, over the 
outcome of every criminal case.  Indeed, “the law-on-the-street – the law that 
determines who goes to prison and for how long – is chiefly written by 
prosecutors, not by legislators or judges”.68 
 Many scholars have extended Mnookin and Kornhauser‟s69 concept of 
“bargaining in the shadow of the law”, which focused on out-of-court settlements 
in divorce cases, to the area of criminal law.  As William Stuntz puts it, “Criminal 
litigation likewise has a working settlement market.”70  For the most part, in the 
area of plea bargaining, “scholars view the shadow of trial as the overwhelming 
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determinant of plea bargaining.”71  Stephanos Bibas strikes down this paradigm, 
though, contending that this model overlooks structural impediments that distort 
bargaining.  Namely, poor lawyering, agency costs, and lawyers‟ self-interest are 
all at play in the plea bargaining calculus.  Bibas explains that “some defendants‟ 
plea bargains diverge from trial shadows much more than others‟…Plea 
bargaining effectively bases sentences in part on wealth, sex, age, education, 
intelligence, and confidence.”72  Bibas challenges Justice White‟s assumption in 
Gregg that plea bargaining is based on the strength of the case, contending, “This 
ideal asks prosecutors to be…perfectly faithful agents of the public interest.”73  
While the strength of the case is the most heavily weighed factor, others are 
considered, such as prosecutors‟ personal incentives to reduce their workload, 
their desire to ensure a conviction by way of a plea, the effect a loss at trial would 
have on their public image, as well as availability of funds to take a given case to 
trial.  Other research suggests that high crime rates affect plea bargaining, also, 
indicating that high crime rates prompt restrictive plea bargaining.
74
  This finding 
reminds one of the role prosecutors play as policymakers and the influence the 
political environment has on their decision making. 
 It is evident from the literature that plea bargaining takes on the form of a 
capital marketplace wherein certain crimes have a “going rate”75 and the 
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prosecutor‟s leniency is commodified.76  Criminal law scholar Gerald Lynch puts 
it this way: “Where almost no one pays the „manufacturer‟s suggested retail 
price,‟ and almost everyone buys the item at a „discounted‟ price, no one really 
gets a „bargain,‟ and the product‟s real price is what is actually charged in the 
marketplace.”77  The question central to this thesis, though, is how do such market 
forces affect the death penalty, and how do they affect it in Maricopa County, 
specifically?   
Regarding the effect plea bargaining has on the death penalty, Albert 
Alschuler puts it bluntly: “Plea bargaining devalues the death penalty.  It changes 
what the death penalty is about”.78  In light of the fact that an estimated 75% of 
the defendants executed since Gregg could have avoided the death penalty by 
accepting a plea bargain
79
, Alschuler reasons that defendants are executed not 
only for their crime, but also for the “crime of standing trial.”80  To the extent that 
supporters of capital punishment contend that some crimes are so heinous, 
execution is the only appropriate punishment, Alschuler finds that plea bargaining 
completely undercuts the death penalty.  Under this justification, if the state is 
prepared to pursue a sentence of death for a defendant so depraved that he is 
eligible for the ultimate penalty, offering any lesser sentence perverts both the 
objectives of the state‟s attorneys and the death penalty itself.   
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But of course, in a market such as plea bargaining, money talks.  Susan 
Ehrhard-Dietzel notes “the pivotal role economics can play in prosecutorial 
decision making in capital cases.”81  Although a case may have several 
aggravating factors that clearly make it death-eligible, the presence of mitigating 
factors, a lack of evidence, and the prosecutor‟s perceived chance of winning at 
trial may lead to a plea bargain due to the enormous costs of a capital trial and 
later appeals.  Ehrhard-Dietzel‟s study on the use of plea bargaining as a tool also 
indicated that prosecutor‟s take ethical considerations into account in death-
eligible cases. For example: 
One prosecutor said that he does not imagine too many prosecutors would 
seek a capital indictment for the purpose of obtaining leverage in plea 
bargaining because you have to do so much work with the motions and 
you are scrutinized so much more by the media and by the victim‟s family 
and by the officers who worked the case.
82
 
Though the Court authorized the use of plea bargaining in capital cases in Brady 
v. United States
83
, many scholars in the area have determined the use of plea 
bargaining has ultimately made a hollow threat of the death penalty.
84
  A near 
consensus by major scholars who study capital plea bargaining, who conclude that 
is cheapens the death penalty, really calls into question the ethical and practical 
purposes of plea bargaining in death-eligible cases. 
                                                 
81
 Ehrhard-Dietzel, Susan. 2012. The Use of Life and Death as Tools in Plea Bargaining. Criminal 
Justice Review 37.1, 89-109, quoting at 98. 
82
 Id., quoting at 99. 
83
 397 U.S.742 (1970). 
84
 Supra note 81, quoting at 101. 
20 
 
In response to how plea bargaining affects the death penalty in Maricopa 
County, it is as Bibas says: hidden from public view.
85
  The researcher‟s request 
for Maricopa County Attorney‟s Office‟s plea bargaining protocol in capital and 
non-capital cases was denied.  The response I was given was: “MCAO policies 
are considered attorney work-product and it is not our practice to release these 
policies outside the office.”86  Though Gary Lowenthal gained access to MCAO‟s 
plea bargaining procedure in 2003 under Richard M. Romley‟s tenure as county 
attorney
87
, current county attorney Bill Montgomery, evidently, is not so 
disclosing.   
D. WORTHY OF DEATH 
In 2010, Andrew Ficklin was found guilty of brutally beating two elderly 
women in a rooming house with a crutch; raping and killing one of them.  Also in 
2010, Efren Medina was found guilty of stealing a 71 year-old man‟s car, then 
repeatedly running him over until he was dead, referring to him as a “speedbump” 
to his friend.  Is one of these men more deathworthy than the other?
88
  According 
to a jury – yes.  Ficklin was sentenced to life in prison and Medina was sentenced 
to death, despite Ficklin having two victims (one died) and being 30 years old at 
the time of the offense, and Medina having one victim and was 18 years old at the 
time of the offense.   
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The United States Supreme Court confirms that some defendants are “the 
most deserving of execution.”89  NYU law professor Robert Blecker agrees, 
arguing that the most depraved defendants should be punished proportionately to 
the evil of their acts.  A Hammurabi subscriber and self-proclaimed 
“retributivist”, Blecker believes that “some people kill so viciously, with an 
attitude so callous or cruel, that they deserve to die – and society has an obligation 
to execute them”.90  It is the “reckless indifference” of the defendant, as 
established in Tison v. Arizona
91
, which Blecker refers to, and the rationale that 
“the offender‟s crime, the „affront to humanity‟ supersedes the value of his or her 
own humanity that must be restored with his or her life.”92  However, Blecker 
assumes Justice Stevens‟ narrowing approach in that he contends that fewer death 
sentences are needed, with a more a just application.  Blecker notes that only very 
few cases are so egregious as to deserve execution, cautioning that “the death 
penalty is too final and too profound to be administered wholesale”, yet “our 
responsibility is to figure out who should be included in that small minority – the 
very worst of the worst – who deserve to die.”93 
The search for the “executable subject”94 is the purpose of this thesis.  
Who deserves to die is a determination the death penalty requires.  “By 
constructing deathworthy subjects, the Court also constructs a moral universe 
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based on a scale of human worth that must be continuously rebalanced.”95  The 
“reckless indifference” finding in Tison may well be one of the defining features 
of the worst of the worst, though Sarat suggests that the reckless indifference 
finding “serves to thematically capture generally what might be called the „higher 
malice‟ that underlies our consensus on who deserves the ultimate sanction.  It is 
a kind of motive and attitude that evokes the righteous anger of execution.”96  In a 
courtroom where prosecutors approach capital defendants with a “motive-hunting 
of a motiveless malignancy”97, the task of determining the worst of the worst is 
difficult indeed.  
E. ARIZONA’S DEATH PENALTY 
 Because of the exceedingly unsettling implications of Donohue‟s findings 
for the United States‟ current death penalty system, it is crucial that further 
research in other states to be conducted.  On a smaller scale and with some 
alterations to fit within the scope of the research, this thesis sets out to determine 
if Donohue‟s findings of arbitrariness in Connecticut‟s death penalty system are 
present in Maricopa County‟s system.  Arizona is ranked 11th in the nation for 
number of executions since 1976
98
, and Maricopa County has by far the most 
inmates on death row of any county in Arizona.
99
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 In Arizona, the death penalty may only be imposed for first degree 
premeditated murder or felony murder pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1105.  This section 
classifies first degree murder as: 
1.  Intending or knowing that the person's conduct will cause death, the 
person causes the death of another person, including an unborn child, with 
premeditation or, as a result of causing the death of another person with 
premeditation, causes the death of an unborn child. 
2.  Acting either alone or with one or more other persons the person 
commits or attempts to commit sexual conduct with a minor, sexual 
assault, molestation of a child, terrorism, marijuana offenses, dangerous 
drug offenses, narcotics offenses that equal or exceed the statutory 
threshold amount for each offense or combination of offenses, involving 
or using minors in drug offenses, drive by shooting, kidnapping, burglary, 
arson, robbery, escape, child abuse, or unlawful flight from a pursuing law 
enforcement vehicle and, in the course of and in furtherance of the offense 
or immediate flight from the offense, the person or another person causes 
the death of any person. 
3.  Intending or knowing that the person's conduct will cause death to a 
law enforcement officer, the person causes the death of a law enforcement 
officer who is in the line of duty. 
Arizona‟s capital sentencing scheme is proscribed in A.R.S. § 13, Sections 
751- 759.  Section 751, subsection F enumerates the following aggravating 
circumstances the jury must consider in determining whether to impose a sentence 
of death: 
1.  The defendant has been convicted of another offense in the United 
States for which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or 
death was imposable. 
2.  The defendant has been or was previously convicted of a serious 
offense, whether preparatory or completed. Convictions for serious 
offenses committed on the same occasion as the homicide, or not 
committed on the same occasion but consolidated for trial with the 
homicide, shall be treated as a serious offense under this paragraph. 
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3.  In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a 
grave risk of death to another person or persons in addition to the person 
murdered during the commission of the offense. 
4.  The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or 
promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value. 
5.  The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, 
or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value. 
6.  The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or 
depraved manner. 
7.  The defendant committed the offense while: 
(a) In the custody of or on authorized or unauthorized release from the 
state department of corrections, a law enforcement agency or a county or 
city jail. 
(b) On probation for a felony offense. 
8. The defendant has been convicted of one or more other homicides, as 
defined in section 13-1101, that were committed during the commission of 
the offense. 
9.  The defendant was an adult at the time the offense was committed or 
was tried as an adult and the murdered person was under fifteen years of 
age, was an unborn child in the womb at any stage of its development or 
was seventy years of age or older. 
10. The murdered person was an on duty peace officer who was killed in 
the course of performing the officer's official duties and the defendant 
knew, or should have known, that the murdered person was a peace 
officer. 
11. The defendant committed the offense with the intent to promote, 
further or assist the objectives of a criminal street gang or criminal 
syndicate or to join a criminal street gang or criminal syndicate.  
12. The defendant committed the offense to prevent a person's cooperation 
with an official law enforcement investigation, to prevent a person's 
testimony in a court proceeding, in retaliation for a person's cooperation 
with an official law enforcement investigation or in retaliation for a 
person's testimony in a court proceeding. 
13. The offense was committed in a cold, calculated manner without 
pretense of moral or legal justification. 
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14. The defendant used a remote stun gun or an authorized remote stun 
gun in the commission of the offense.  
Subsection G of this statute outlines the mitigating factors the jury should 
consider in its deliberations, including but not limited to: 1) the defendant‟s 
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct; 2) the defendant was 
under unusual and substantial duress; 3) the defendant‟s participation was 
relatively minor; 4) the defendant could not have reasonably foreseen that his 
conduct would cause a grave risk of death to another person; and 5) the 
defendant‟s age.  Subsection E guides the jury‟s sentencing discretion, stating, 
“The trier of fact shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact finds one or 
more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection F of this section 
and then determines that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently 
substantial to call for leniency.”100 
III. BOOLEAN AND STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF CAPITAL 
SENTENCING OUTCOMES IN MARICOPA COUNTY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To capture both the intricacies of each case as well as the trending patterns 
of the data, both Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and logistic regression 
analysis are implemented to study death sentence outcomes.  The QCA 
methodology aims to identify the necessary conditions to receive a death sentence 
in Maricopa County, while the statistical methodology aims to identify the 
likelihood of receiving a death sentence in Maricopa County.  Although QCA is 
an appropriate method in research with a small N, such as this, the nature of the 
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death penalty calls for a secondary method, too.  The Supreme Court has ruled 
that during the penalty phase, “the defendant and the state may present any 
evidence that is relevant to the determination of whether there is mitigation that is 
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency”101, the Lockett requirement of 
individualized sentencing preempts a finding of both necessary and sufficient 
conditions which predict a death sentence in all given instances.  Consideration of 
any and all mitigating factors, the problem of plea bargaining, as well as the 
perennial lesson that one cannot predict the jury‟s verdict, led to the conclusion 
that QCA alone is insufficient to adequately account for the sentencing outcomes 
in the capital cases studied.  Accordingly, logistic regression analysis in 
conjunction with QCA is employed to analyze capital sentencing outcomes in 
Maricopa County. 
B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A recent New York Times article by editorial writer Lincoln Caplan, 
entitled The Random Horror of the Death Penalty
102
, spotlighted John Donohue‟s 
study.  In his article, Caplan emphasized Donohue‟s finding that “rather than 
punish the worst criminals, the Connecticut system…operates with „arbitrariness 
and discrimination‟”.103  Caplan‟s NYT article concludes that the findings 
Donohue‟s study provides are “strong evidence that every state system is arbitrary 
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and capricious.  The death penalty in Connecticut is clearly unconstitutional, 
barbaric, and should be abolished…”104 
Upon reading Caplan‟s article, one is compelled to turn to Donohue‟s 
research to see for oneself the indictment of our capital punishment system – and 
it is damning indeed.  Donohue studied application of the death penalty in 
Connecticut from 1973-2007, during which 4,686 murders were committed.  Of 
those murders, 205 were death-eligible and resulted in a conviction, and of these, 
138 were charged with a capital felony.  Of the 138 capital cases, 46 were allowed 
to plead guilty to a non-capital offense, 26 were acquitted, and 66 were convicted 
of a capital felony.  These 66 cases resulted in 29 going to a death penalty 
hearing, 9 receiving death sentences, and one being executed.  From these 
numbers, Donohue decided that Connecticut‟s handling of capital cases reflected 
“a chaotic and unsound criminal justice policy that serves neither deterrence nor 
retribution”.105 
Next, Donohue determined whether Connecticut was upholding the 
constitutional requirement of reserving capital punishment for those deemed “the 
most deserving of execution”106 by measuring the egregiousness of each case.  To 
do this, Donohue devised both a Composite Egregiousness score and an Overall 
Score.  Determination of the Composite Score was based upon coders‟ rating the 
egregiousness of each case on a scale of 1 to 3 based on four factors: 1) Victim 
Suffering (intensity, duration, degree of physical pain/mental anguish); 2) Victim 
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Characteristics (including whether the victim was a law enforcement officer, 
victim‟s age, possible disability); 3) Defendant Intent/Culpability (motive, 
premeditation, presence of mental impairment/drug impairment at the time of the 
crime); and 4) Number of victims.  Determination of the Overall Score was based 
upon coders‟ ratings on a 1 to 5 scale of the overall egregiousness level of the 
case, aimed to capture a more general reaction.  What Donohue concluded from 
comparing the egregiousness level of the cases was that, “Any claim to properly 
punishing such a narrow and specific category of the most serious offenses can 
definitively be put to rest” and, “At best, the Connecticut system haphazardly 
singles out a handful for execution from a substantial array of horrible 
murders”.107 
The final prong in Donohue‟s analysis of the death penalty system in 
Connecticut involves a multiple regression analysis testing for the presence of 
arbitrariness or discrimination in the state‟s implementation of capital 
punishment.  In particular, Donohue examines both legitimate and “legally 
suspect” variables influencing capital charging and sentencing decisions; the latter 
of which includes the race and gender of the defendants, the race of the victim, 
and the judicial district
108
 in which the murder occurred.  In this regard, Donohue 
finds that “arbitrariness and discrimination are defining features of the state‟s 
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capital punishment regime”109, not to mention the disparate racial outcomes in 
which minority defendants who commit capital murder of white victims are six 
times more likely to receive a death sentence as those defendants whose victims 
are a minority.
110
 
C. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 This thesis tests the hypotheses arising out of three major models of 
capital punishment, beginning with that proposed by Donohue.   
Donohue Model 
Based on Donohue‟s finding of discrimination in Connecticut‟s death penalty 
system, the prediction under this model is that the race of the defendants and their 
victims affects their likelihood of receiving the death penalty.  Thus, the presence 
of discrimination in Maricopa County‟s death penalty system will be examined 
with this model.  In Boolean terms, the hypothesis to be tested is: 
d_white * V_WHITE = DEATH 
Here, lowercase d_white denotes a non-white defendant, uppercase V_WHITE 
denotes a white victim, and DEATH denotes a sentence of death by jury.  This 
hypothesis is verbalized as the presence of a non-white defendant with the 
presence of white victim will result in the outcome of a death sentence.   
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Illinois Commission Model 
 Prior to the state‟s abolition of the death penalty in 2011, the Illinois 
Commission on Capital Punishment recommended reduction of the states‟ list of 
death-eligible criteria from 20 factors to five.  The five eligibility factors are: 1) 
the murder of peace officer; 2) the murder of any person occurring at a 
correctional facility; 3) the murder of two or more persons; 4) the murder of a 
person involving the infliction of torture; and 5) the murder by a person under 
investigation for or convicted of a crime of anyone involved in the investigation.  
The Commission determined these five factors to be egregious as to be reasonable 
indicators of those cases most worthy of execution.  To determine whether the 
five factors the Commission recommended represent the most egregious cases in 
the sample, the hypothesis to be tested under this model is that the presence of any 
one of or a combination of these factors will result in a death sentence.  In 
Boolean terms, the hypothesis is:  
OFFICER + JAIL + 2+VCTMS + CRUEL + WTNSS = DEATH 
In other words, the killing of an officer, or (the + symbol indicates the „or‟ 
operation), a murder occurring at a correctional facility, or the killing of multiple 
victims, or a cruel murder, or the killing of a witness to an investigation will result 
in the outcome of a death sentence. 
 
 
31 
 
Functional Model 
 This model is called the „Functional Model‟ because it aims to test 
whether Maricopa County‟s death penalty scheme operates as required by the 
Constitution: by reserving the death penalty for the worst of the worst.  Arizona‟s 
capital punishment statutes enumerate several aggravating circumstances for the 
jury to consider, among the most egregious include the killing of multiple victims, 
the defendant being convicted of a prior serious offense, the murder being 
committed in a cruel or depraved manner, and the presence of sexual assault.  
Also, Arizona‟s statutes require the jury to consider any mitigating evidence 
presented by the defendant that calls for leniency.  Accordingly, the hypothesis 
under the Functional Model, in Boolean terms, is: 
2+VCTMS * PRIOR * CRUEL* S_ASSLT * mitgn = DEATH 
Thus, this model predicts that the presence of a combination of these four 
aggravating factors (the * symbol indicates the „and‟ operation) plus a lack of 
mitigating evidence will result in the outcome of a death sentence. 
While every murder is needless and cruel, the Court has determined that capital 
punishment is not appropriate for all murders, and should be reserved for only the 
worst of the worst.  Indeed, the worst of the worst cases involve not just the 
presence of one aggravating factor, but the presence of multiple factors.  
Arizona‟s death penalty scheme deems cases in which the defendant has 
committed multiple homicides, has a prior conviction, committed the crime in a 
cruel or depraved manner, killed a peace officer or a witness in an investigation, 
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or committed the crime while at a correctional facility, as eligible for execution.  
These three models – the Donohue Model, the Illinois Commission Model, and 
the Functional Model – are tested to determine whether Arizona‟s death penalty 
scheme not only targets the worst of the worst, but does so free from 
discrimination. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
A. Determination of the Research Design 
 In a 2009 lecture given at a summer methods workshop in Slovenia
111
, 
Benoît Rihoux introduced students to QCA, a comparative method pioneered by 
Charles Ragin in his 1987 work by the same name.112  Rihoux, a premier scholar 
and innovator in the area of QCA, presents QCA as both a methodology and a 
technique that creates a dialogue between ideas and evidence, theory and data.  At 
its core, QCA is a case-oriented, comparative methodology that considers the 
combination of conditions that result in a particular social phenomenon.113   
In terms of small-N cases, QCA is particularly suitable for systematically 
testing a theory because it maintains the complexity of each case while also 
studying the phenomenon holistically.  QCA assumes multiple conjunctural 
causation, or causal complexity, which posits that a combination of conditions 
produce change
114
, rather than one isolate condition.  Accordingly, QCA refers to 
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„variables‟ as „conditions‟ in that the assumption is that each condition is not 
really independent from another.  The objective of QCA is to determine the key 
combinations of conditions that lead to the outcome of interest, which in this 
instance, is a sentence of death.  
QCA relies on Boolean algebra for its analysis.  There are a number of 
basic features of Boolean algebra that are important to note.
115
  First, Boolean 
algebra uses binary data in which the condition is true (or present) and false (or 
absent).  The presence of a condition is denoted by either a 1 or uppercase letters, 
and the absence of a condition is denoted by either a 0 or lowercase letters.  For 
example, a potential finding could be that a defendant with a prior conviction who 
also killed multiple victims receives the outcome condition of a death sentence.  
The Boolean expression that expresses this finding is: 
PRIOR * 2+VCMTS = DEATH 
The uppercase letters indicate the presence of the conditions; the presence of a 
prior conviction and multiple victims leads to a death sentence.   
Secondly, Boolean algebra uses a truth table to represent the data.  A raw 
truth table is constructed showing each case, the conditions to be analyzed, and 
the outcome. Next, each specific case is compared with the others and sorted into 
their different combinations of values with regards to the conditions.  For 
instance, all the capital cases resulting in a death sentence and in which the 
defendant had a prior conviction and killed multiple victims would represent one 
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configuration, or scenario, in the data.  All the cases resulting in a life in prison 
sentence and in which the defendant had a prior serious offense conviction, but 
only one victim and presented mitigating evidence would be another 
configuration.  In Table 1, demonstrating a hypothetical truth tale, each row 
represents a configuration, rather than an individual case.   
                                                         Table 1.  Hypothetical Truth Table 
A B C Y 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 
1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 0 
                                                           
Thus, row 1 represents the scenario where conditions A, B, and C, are absent, and 
the outcome condition, Y, is present, etc. 
The next basic feature of Boolean algebra is the addition and 
multiplication functions.  In Boolean algebra, the + function indicates „or‟ and the 
* function indicates „and‟.  Accordingly, the statement A + B = Z indicates the 
presence of A or B results in the outcome Z.  Either the condition A or B is 
sufficient to result in Z.  The statement A * B = Z indicates condition A and 
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condition B result in the presence of outcome Z. Both conditions A and B are 
necessary to result in outcome Z.     
The key operation in Boolean algebra is Boolean minimization, which 
takes the “primitive” expressions from the truth table and simplifies them.  The 
objective of Boolean minimization, also called paired comparisons
116
, is to 
simplify the complexity in the truth table to the most parsimonious expression 
possible.  Ragin explains Boolean minimization this way: 
If two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition yet produce 
the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two 
expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a 
simpler, combined expression.
117
 
Though this sounds daunting, the process is simple.  Ragin provides the following 
example (each abc group represents a different configuration): Abc combines with 
ABc to produce Ac.  The condition „b‟ is removed because it is irrelevant: since 
both expressions result in the same outcome, the presence and absence of b have 
no effect.  Similarly, abC combines with aBC to produce aC
118
.  This bottom-up 
simplification produces prime implicants, which is the combined expression of 
two similar configurations less the irrelevant condition that distinguishes them. 
 The final feature of Boolean analysis is formation of a prime implicant 
chart which culminates in a logical equation, or solution, for the outcome of 
interest.  Because there are typically more prime implicants than necessary to 
                                                 
116
 Ragin, Charles C. 1989.The Logic of the Comparative Method and the Algebra of Logic. 
Journal of Quantitative Anthropology 1, 373-398, quoting at 380. 
117
 Supra note 112, quoting at 93. 
118
 Id., quoting at 94. 
36 
 
cover all the causal combinations for a particular outcome, a prime implicant 
chart allows the researcher to juxtapose the prime implicants to the original 
expressions from the truth table to obtain the most reduced expression leading to 
the desired outcome.  The table shown in Figure 1119 encapsulates all the phases 
of Boolean algebra just presented: 
                                  Figure 1. Boolean Algebra Process 
 
At first glance, QCA may seem unorthodox to many scholars used to 
using statistical methods in research, but it is appropriate for this study for several 
reasons.  Because the sample being analyzed is small – 34 capital cases that went 
                                                 
119 Figure 1 is credited to Ragin (1989), supra note 116. 
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to trial from 2009 to 2011 – QCA allows for a holistic and “textured picture”120 of 
the sentencing outcomes of interest.  QCA also retains the complexity and 
disposition of each case while contemporaneously searching for patterns in 
conditions and respective outcomes.  In consideration of what type of defendant 
qualifies as the worst of the worst, one may assume such defendant would have 
several, not just one, aggravating circumstances surrounding his or her crime, 
with little mitigation to call for leniency.  If one accepts this assumption, one must 
also accept that it is a combination of factors that results in a defendant receiving 
a death sentence.  Because, as the literature indicates, the proliferation of death-
eligibility factors make 90% of murders eligible for the death penalty in most 
states, QCA allows for one to comb through the copious death-eligible cases to 
identify not only which cases result in a death sentence, but the amalgamation of 
factors contributing to such an outcome. 
While QCA identifies the combination of conditions present in the sample 
that resulted in a death sentence, it lacks the prediction capacity of a statistical 
methodology.  To achieve this end, logistic regression analysis is implemented to 
complement and augment the findings of the Boolean analysis.  The use of both 
case-oriented and variable-oriented methodologies aims to appreciate the 
complexity and intricacies within each case in the sample, as well as identify 
trends and probabilities related to capital sentencing.   
                                                 
120
 Ragin, Charles C., Susan E. Mayer, and Kriss A. Drass. 1984. Assessing Discrimination: A 
Boolean Approach. American Sociological Review, 49, 221-234, quoting at 231. 
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B. Sources of Data 
 The data source of capital cases from 2009 through 2011 was obtained 
from the Maricopa County Superior Court, and is referred to as the Capital 
Inventory121.  The Arizona Attorney General‟s Office also provided a list of 
capital cases122 for the given time period which was cross-referenced with the 
Capital Inventory.  The Inventory is organized by month, providing the case 
number, the defendant‟s last name, and outcome.  There were a total of 145 
capital cases listed in the given time period.  The range of outcomes are as 
follows: Dismissed; Dismissed by Prosecution; Dismissed Due to Mental 
Incompetence; Incompetent – Order of Restoration; Inactive Status; Notice to 
Remove Death Penalty; Notice Withdrawn; Remand to Grand Jury; Plea to 
Reduced Charge; Plea – No Contest; Plea to Second Degree; Plea to First Degree; 
and Guilty by Jury.
123
  This research focuses on those capital cases with an 
outcome of „Guilty by Jury‟ and a sentence of either life imprisonment (including 
natural life) or death.  Of the 145 total capital cases in the Inventory, 34 
defendants were found guilty by jury, 22 received a sentence of death, and 12 
received life imprisonment.  
 Once the case numbers were noted from the Capital Inventory, additional 
facts of each case were obtained from Maricopa County Superior Court minute 
                                                 
121
 See Capital Inventory attached as Appendix B, Maricopa County Superior Court. 2007-2012. 
Capital Inventory. 
122
 Daniel Vidal, Arizona Attorney General‟s Office paralegal, February 2, 2012, email 
correspondence to author. 
123
 One case in the data set (Arizona v. Leher) was remanded for resentencing as it was a “Ring 
case”; Ring v. Arizona (2002) required the trier of fact/sentencer in all capital cases to be a jury, 
rather than a judge. 
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entries
124
, the Arizona Department of Corrections website125, and media outlets.
126
  
Nearly all data crucial to this research was obtained from the minute entries.  
Such data includes the date of the offense, the date of sentencing, the defendant‟s 
date of birth, the number of counts against the defendant, the number of victims, 
and the aggravating factors the jury unanimously found.  The minute entries 
provided information as to mitigation, too, however the specific mitigating factors 
the jury found proven were not identified, as it was with the aggravating factors.  
It could only be determined from the minute entries whether mitigating evidence 
was presented or not.
127
   
The Arizona Department of Corrections website was utilized to determine 
the race of the defendant, as the website provides a detailed profile on each 
inmate through the inmate search feature.  Nearly all data for this study was 
relatively easy to access, with the race of the victims being the exception.  Neither 
the original indictment, the minute entries, nor the AZDOC website offered 
information on the race of the victims.  Thus, information for this variable was 
obtained from media outlets and their coverage of the case.  Since capital trials 
are high-profile, media coverage on the cases was not difficult to find.  However, 
                                                 
124
 Clerk of Superior Court‟s Office: Maricopa County, Arizona. 2012. http://www.courtminutes. 
maricopa.gov/ (last accessed April 4, 2012). 
125 Arizona Department of Corrections. 2012. http://www.azcorrections.gov/ 
Inmate_datasearch/Index_Minh.aspx (last accessed April 4, 2012). 
126
 AZCentral.com: Arizona‟s Homepage. 2012. http://www.azcentral.com/ (last accessed April 4, 
2012), and MyFoxPhoenix.com. 2012. www.myfoxphoenix.com (last accessed April 4, 2012). 
127
  Nearly all defendants presented mitigation; 3 waived the mitigation phase of the trial (Hausner, 
Delahanty, and Joseph), and in 3 cases, it was unclear in the minute entries whether mitigating 
evidence was presented. 
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the data indicate missing values for 3 of the defendants‟ victims as their race 
could not reliably be determined. 
In terms of defining race for the purpose of this research, the definition 
that John Donohue relies upon in his Connecticut study is also the definition used 
here.  Accordingly, „non-white‟ refers to Hispanic and non-white individuals, and 
„white‟ refers to non-Hispanic white individuals.128 
C. Research Design 
 Based on the Capital Inventory and information provided by the Arizona 
Attorney General‟s Office, the population of this study is comprised of all capital 
cases from 2009 through 2011 which went to trial and were sentenced to either 
life imprisonment or death.   As the objective of the study is to determine whether 
those cases sentenced to death were the worst of the worst, as compared to those 
cases that received life imprisonment, the egregiousness of each case was 
measured.  Based upon Donohue‟s egregiousness measure developed in his 2011 
study, Table 2 identifies the conditions (aka variables) to be analyzed: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
128
 Supra note 1 at 7. 
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        Table 2. Summary of Conditions/Variables 
Label Description (1 = presence; 0 = absence) Data Source 
DEATH Jury verdict: dichotomous category of death 
sentence (1) or life imprisonment (0) 
 
Case minute 
entries 
D_WHITE Race of the defendant: dichotomous category 
of white (1) or non-white (0) 
Arizona 
Department of 
Corrections 
 
V_WHITE Race of the victim: dichotomous category of 
white (1) or non-white (0) 
 
Media outlets 
 
2+VCTMS Number of victims killed: dichotomous 
category of 1(1) or 2+ (0) 
 
Case minute 
entries 
 
PRIOR Defendant convicted of  either another offense 
in the U.S. in which under Arizona law a 
sentence of life imprisonment or death was 
imposable OR defendant was previously 
convicted of a serious offense: dichotomous 
category of yes (1) or no (0) 
 
Case minute 
entries 
CRUEL Defendant committed the offense in an 
especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner: 
dichotomous category of yes (1) or no (0) 
 
Case minute 
entries 
S_ASSLT Defendant committed sexual assault: 
dichotomous category of yes (1) or no (0) 
Case minute 
entries 
 
 
OFFICER The victim was an on duty peace officer: 
dichotomous category of yes (1) or no (0) 
Case minute 
entries 
 
 
WTNSS The victim was killed as a result of cooperating 
with a law enforcement investigation: 
dichotomous category of yes (1) or no (0) 
 
Case minute 
entries 
 
 
 
JAIL 
 
The victim was killed while being at a 
correctional facility (in the capacity of inmate, 
staff, visitor, etc.); dichotomous category of 
yes (1) or no (0) 
 
Case minute 
entries 
MITGN Defendant presented mitigating evidence at 
trial: dichotomous category of yes (1) or no (0) 
Case minute 
entries 
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To analyze the data using Boolean analysis, the raw truth table represented in 
Table 3 was constructed: 
Table 3. Raw Truth Table 
DEFENDANT 
D
ea
th
 
D
_
W
H
I
T
E
 
V
_
W
H
I
T
E
 
2
+
V
C
T
M
S
 
P
R
IO
R
 
C
R
U
E
L
 
S
_
A
S
S
L
T
 
O
F
F
IC
E
R
 
W
T
N
S
S
 
JA
IL
 
M
IT
G
N
 
HAUSNER 1 1 - 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
LEHR 1 1 - 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
DELAHANTY 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
GALLARDO 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
DIETEMAN 0 1 - 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
COTA 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CALVILLO 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
SAUCEDA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
VANWINKLE 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
PATTERSON 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
MEDINA 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
BOYSTON 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
OVANTE, JR. 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
VASQUEZ 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
C. SERMENO 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 
JOSEPH 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PARKER 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
ENRIQUEZ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 - 
HENDERSON 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
FISH 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
A. SERMENO 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
FITZGERALD 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
BLAND 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
FICKLIN 0 1 - 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
GOMEZ 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
ROSE 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
HERNANDEZ 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
BURNS 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
NARANJO 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
REEVES 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
MILLER 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
BENSON 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
GOUDEAU 1 0 - 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
BLACK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 
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To conduct the Boolean analysis, Tosmana
129
 software was utilized.  
Because of the availability of data, this thesis studies capital case outcomes at trial 
level only.  A definitive determination of the constitutionality of the death penalty 
and the justness of its application should follow capital cases beyond the trial 
outcome, through the appeal process, and up to the point where the defendant gets 
executed or not.  Indeed, this is what Donohue did in his study, which is why his 
finding of 4,686 murders resulting in one, single execution is as damning and 
debilitating as it is.130  Due to funding and time constraints, however, replicating a 
study as comprehensive and exhaustive as Donohue‟s, unfortunately, is beyond 
the scope this particular work.   
V. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
 As illustrated in both Table 4 and Figure 2, nearly twice as many non-
white defendants received a death sentence in the sample than white defendants, 
and nearly 60% of the defendants who received a death sentence had killed a non-
white victim.  Over three-fourths of the sample (82%) who received a death 
sentence had been convicted of a prior serious offense, and approximately 64% 
were found to have committed the crime in a cruel or depraved manner.  As 
evident in Table 4, both multiple victims and having a prior conviction are 
                                                 
129
 Cronqvist, Lasse. 2011. Tosmana - Tool for Small-N Analysis [Version 1.3.2]. Trier. Software 
downloaded from http://www.tosmana.net. 
130
 Donohue‟s method of case inclusion is described as, “When analyzing a case, I use the final 
outcome of the case as a whole, not the outcome of the first trial (if the final outcome happens to 
differ from the initial trial outcome)… Therefore, for each legal matter, I focus on the final 
outcome and not on earlier outcomes that are reversed on appeal.” Supra note 1, quoting at 64-65, 
emphasis in original. 
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significantly associated with the outcome of a death sentence (although only at the 
.10 level). 
                   Table 4. Descriptives 
Variable Death 
% (N) 
Life 
% (N) 
Chi
2    
 P-value
†
 
D_WHITE 
     White 
     Non-white 
 
36.4 (8) 
63.6 (14) 
 
33.3 (4) 
66.7 (8) 
 
.031   .860 
V_WHITE 
     White 
     Non-white 
 
42.1 (8) 
57.9 (11) 
 
50.0 (5) 
50.0 (5) 
.165 .684 
 
2+VCTMS 
     1 victim 
    2+ victims 
 
 
45.5 (10) 
54.6 (12) 
 
 
75.0 (9) 
25.0 (3) 
 
2.75 
 
.097
†
 
 
PRIOR 
     Yes 
     No 
 
 
81.8 (18) 
18.2 (4) 
 
 
54.6 (6) 
45.5 (5) 
 
2.75 
 
.097
†
 
 
CRUEL 
     Yes 
     No 
 
 
63.6 (14) 
36.4 (8) 
 
 
36.4 (4) 
63.6 (7) 
 
2.20 
 
.138 
 
S_ASSLT 
     Yes 
     No 
 
 
22.7 (5) 
77.3 (17) 
 
 
8.3 (1) 
91.7 (11) 
 
1.11 
 
.293 
 
OFFICER 
     Yes 
     No 
 
 
9.09 (2) 
90.9 (20) 
 
 
0.00 (0) 
100 (12) 
 
1.16 
 
.282 
 
WTNSS 
     Yes 
     No 
 
 
4.55 (1) 
95.5 (21) 
 
 
0.00 (0) 
100 (12) 
 
.562 
 
.453 
 
JAIL 
     Yes 
     No 
 
 
4.55 (1) 
95.5 (21) 
 
 
0.00 (0) 
100 (12) 
 
.562 
 
.453 
 
MITGN 
     Yes 
     No 
 
 
81.8 (18) 
18.2 (4) 
 
 
81.8 (9) 
18.2 (2) 
 
 
0.00 
 
 
1.00 
    † < .10 
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Figure 2. Descriptives Chart 
 
 In Figure 2, one notes that the presence of mitigation131 had no effect on 
the likelihood of the sentencing outcome, and surprisingly, neither did the 
presence of sexual assault.  The largest disparity between life and death sentences 
manifests from factors affecting the egregiousness of the crime, namely, prior 
convictions, cruel murders, and multiple victims. 
B. Boolean Analysis 
 Because QCA assumes multiple conjunctural causation, what typically are 
referred to as „variables‟ are referred to as „conditions‟ here, since the individual 
factors are considered to combine to produce the outcome rather than stand 
independently, and the „result‟ is referred to as the „outcome occurring under a 
given set of circumstances‟, rather than in the probabilistic terms of likelihood.  
                                                 
131
 In this thesis, „mitigation‟ refers to the defendant‟s presentation of mitigating evidence during 
trial, not whether the jury found mitigating evidence.  The reason for this distinction is that it could 
not be determined through the minute entries what mitigating factors the jury found.  
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The three models – the Donohue Model, the Illinois Commission Model, and the 
Functional Model – are presented here with their hypotheses and tested using 
QCA and Boolean algebra. 
1. Donohue Model  
Under the Donohue model, the hypothesis to be tested is that the death 
penalty is dependent upon race.  Specifically, the model predicts that that cases 
involving a non-white defendant and a white victim will result in the outcome of 
death.  In Boolean terms, the hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis: 
d_white * V_WHITE = DEATH 
The lower case d_white denotes the presence of a non-white defendant, the 
asterisk denotes the function of „and-ing‟ the two conditions together, the 
uppercase V_WHITE denotes the presence of a white victim, and the uppercase 
DEATH denotes presence of the death penalty.  Using the software Tosmana132, 
the following result is obtained: 
Result: 
D_WHITE * v_white = DEATH 
Upon analysis, the result obtained using QCA contradicts John Donohue‟s 
finding, and in fact, inverses it.  As shown in Table 5, only one configuration 
(combination of conditions) results in the outcome of death.  All other racial 
combinations show contradictory sentencing outcomes in the data, which means 
that some cases within the given configuration resulted in a sentence of death and 
                                                 
132 Id.  
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others resulted in life imprisonment.  The same is visualized in Figure 3, in which 
the two quadrants below the horizontal axis represent instances where the victim 
is white, and the two quadrants above the axis represent instances where the 
victim is non-white.  Similarly, the two quadrants to the right of the vertical axis 
represent instances where the defendant is white, and the quadrants to the left 
represent instances where the defendant is non-white.  Thus, the upper right 
quadrant represents the solution equation 1 * 0 = 1, which 2 cases satisfy 
(Delahanty and Reeves).  All other cases fall into the other three quadrants which 
have diagonal lines crossing through them indicating the contradictory results (for 
each scenario, both outcomes of a death sentence and life imprisonment exist). 
                              Table 5. Boolean Results of Donohue Model 
N cases133 D_WHITE V_WHITE Outcome 
2 1 0 1 
14 0 0 C 
6 1 1 C 
7 0 1 C 
                                                 
133
 There is only a total of 29 cases for this analysis because the race of the victim was unknown 
for 5 of the cases in the dataset. 
48 
 
                 Figure 3. Venn Diagram of Donohue Model 
 
2. Illinois Commission Model 
Under the Illinois Commission model, the hypothesis to be tested is that 
the death penalty should be reserved for five very grave offenses, namely: the 
murder of a peace officer; murder occurring at a correctional facility; the murder 
of multiple victims; murder committed in a cruel or depraved manner; and the 
murder of a witness to an investigation.  In applying the Commission‟s 
recommendation of these five factors to the data, the hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis: 
OFFICER + JAIL + 2+VCTMS + CRUEL + WTNSS = DEATH 
The + symbol denotes the function of „or‟, so that the presence of any one of these 
aggravating factors makes the defendant eligible for the death penalty. 
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Result: 
cruel * OFFICER * wtnss * jail + 2+vctms * CRUEL * officer * wtnss * jail + 
2+vcmts * CRUEL * officer * wtnss * JAIL + 2+VCTMS * cruel * officer * 
WTNSS * jail = DEATH 
Table 6. Boolean Results of Illinois Commission Model 
N  2+VCTMS CRUEL OFFICER WTNSS  JAIL Outcome 
7 1 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
10 0 1 0 0 0 C 
6 1 0 0 0 0 C 
6 0 0 0 0 0 C 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
 
 
Because QCA looks for the necessary combination of conditions that 
produce a particular outcome, the solution equation for this model is not useful 
because the model predicts the presence of any one of the aggravating factors will 
make the defendant death-eligible, rather than a combination of them.  An 
inspection of Table 6, though, does demonstrate that the Illinois Commission‟s 
recommendation is well-suited for the data, since all cases involving the killing of 
a peace officer, of a witness, or occurring at a correctional facility result in an 
outcome of death.  A combination of multiple victims and a cruel murder also 
result in an outcome of death, but each of those variables on their own provides 
contradictory outcomes.   
Figure 4 provides a visual representation of the results, and differs from 
Figure 3 in that more conditions are incorporated in the analysis so those 
additional configurations result in additional quadrant overlays.  All solid-shaded 
quadrants represent configurations in which the outcome is a death sentence, and 
50 
 
these five scenarios, as reported in Table 6, include egregious murders (multiple 
victims and cruel murder), the murder of a peace officer, the murder of a witness 
to an investigation, and murder occurring at a correctional site.134  Accordingly, a 
Boolean analysis of the Illinois Commission Model strongly suggests that the 
Illinois Capital Commission‟s recommendation of the five aforementioned death-
eligibility factors are, in fact, factors that the jury finds most egregious and most 
likely to return a sentence of death.  
         Figure 4. Venn Diagram of Illinois Commission Model 
 
3. Functional Model 
Under the Functional model, the hypothesis to be tested is that the death 
penalty is implemented for the most deserving – the worst of the worst.  
Specifically, the model predicts that cases involving the presence of a 
                                                 
134 One case represents the overlap of a cruel murder and the murder of a peace officer (Arizona v. 
Rose). 
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combination of aggravating factors will result in a sentence of death.  In Boolean 
terms, the hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis: 
2+VCTMS * CRUEL* PRIOR* S_ASSLT * mitgn = DEATH 
Accordingly, the Functional Model predicts that a murder involving the 
combination of the following will result in an outcome of death: multiple victims; 
a cruel or depraved manner of murder; the defendant having been convicted of a 
prior serious offense; presence of sexual assault; and no presentation of mitigating 
evidence.   
A Boolean analysis of this model, as evidenced in Table 7, concludes that 
in the sample, generally the most egregious cases receive a death sentence by the 
jury.  Because nearly all the defendants present mitigating evidence at trial, the 
influence of mitigation on the outcome is not clear, with some defendants who 
presented mitigating evidence receiving the death penalty, and some defendants 
who did not present any mitigation that received life imprisonment.  The two most 
egregious cases in the sample, Goudeau and Benson, who are represented in 
configuration number 16, had all four aggravating factors present, and received 
the death penalty.  Hausner, who received the death penalty and is represented in 
configuration number 1, is also one of the most egregious cases with three of the 
four aggravating factors present and no presentation of mitigation evidence.  
Table 7 also demonstrates that in all cases where three of four aggravating factors 
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are found, indicating a high level of egregiousness, an outcome of death is 
present.   
        Table 7. Boolean Results of Functional Model 
N 2+VCTMS PRIOR CRUEL S_ASSLT MITGN Outcome 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
2 0 1 0 0 0 1 
5 0 1 1 0 1 C 
2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
5 1 1 0 0 1 C 
4 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
3 1 1 1 0 1 1 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 1 1 1 C 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
          
            Figure 5. Venn Diagram of Functional Model 
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Figure 5 highlights the 10 scenarios that result in a death sentence in the 
data, 4 scenarios that result in a life sentence, and 3 contradictory scenarios with 
both outcomes.  Of the scenarios resulting in a death sentence, 7 of the 10 lie in 
the bottom two quadrants, representing the presence of prior convictions, and 3 of 
the 4 scenarios resulting in a life sentence lie in the upper two quadrants where no 
prior convictions are found.  One notes, also, that the largest cluster of solid-
shaded quadrants is found where the conditions of prior convictions, multiple 
victims, and cruel murders are present. 
C. Logistic Regression Analysis 
 To introduce a probabilistic determination of the likelihood of receiving a 
sentence of death based on both race and the presence/absence of aggravating 
factors, logistic regression analysis is employed to supplement the QCA findings.  
Integrating the complexity-seeking objectives established by QCA135 with the 
generality-seeking objectives of a variable-oriented approach such as logistic 
regression allows a robust examination of capital sentencing outcomes. 
Simply put, logistic regression estimates the odds of a certain event 
occurring.136  Binary logistic regression, different from ordinal logistic regression 
in that it tests categorical variables, is appropriate here because it can be used to 
accommodate a dichotomous dependent variable.  Likewise, logistic regression 
measures individual coefficients, expressed as odds-ratios, to indicate the effect of 
                                                 
135
 Supra note 110 at 54. 
136
 Garson, G. David. 2012. Binary and Multinomial Logistic Regression. http:// 
faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/logistic.htm (last accessed April 3, 2012). 
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a particular variable after holding other effects constant.  Thus, here, the odds-
ratio implies the odds of a non-white defendant receiving a death sentence 
compared to those of a white defendant, and the odds of receiving a death 
sentence with the presence of certain aggravating factors compared to the absence 
of those factors.  An odds-ratio greater than 1 means a positive effect, and an 
odds-ratio between 0 and 1 means a negative effect.  As evident in Table 8137, the 
only factor that is statistically significant when considering the odds of receiving a 
death sentence is the egregiousness of the crime.  While the Functional Model 
measures the effect of each aggravating factor individually, the Aggregate Model 
is a composite variable of all the variables in the Functional Model, thereby 
directly measuring egregiousness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
137
 The Illinois Commission Model could not be tested via logistic regression because there were 
so few instances of the witness/officer/jail variables in the data.  Applicability of the Illinois 
Commission Model is addressed in Part C of this Section. 
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                  Table 8. Logistic Regression of Two Models: Odds Ratio and Z-Scores Displayed 
Variable Donohue Model Functional  
Model 
Aggregate 
Model 
D_WHITE 
      
2.399 
(.86) 
  
 
V_WHITE 
 
.545 
  
 
 
2+ VCTMS 
 
(-.71) 
 
 
 
 
4.363 
(1.56) 
 
 
PRIOR 
      
 4.477 
(1.60) 
 
 
CRUEL 
   
 4.249 
(1.53) 
 
 
S_ASSLT 
 
 
EGREG 
 
 
 
 
2.481 
(.67) 
 
 
 
 
 
4.727** 
(2.64) 
               ** p < .01          
                                                       
                                                        Table 9. Logistic Regression of the Full Model 
Variable Full Model 
D_WHITE 
      
6.765 
(1.29) 
 
V_WHITE 
 
 
EGREG 
 
.132 
(-1.56) 
 
8.540 
(2.15)* 
                                          * p < .05 
Both Tables 8 and 9 report that, when controlling for the other variables, the only 
significant factor in receiving a death sentence is the egregiousness of the crime, 
which fits the prediction of the Functional Model.  Donohue‟s Model, which 
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predicts a non-white defendant whose victim is white is more likely to receive a 
sentence of death, is not evident in the sample.  In fact, both the QCA and logistic 
regression analyses indicate the opposite – white defendants whose victim was 
non-white are more likely to receive a death sentence.  The Illinois Model could 
not directly be tested because so few cases with the given characteristics existed 
in the sample.  However, combining the QCA results with the statistical results, it 
is evident that in fact, the Illinois Model is a reliable predictor for a death sentence 
outcome.  Presence of three of the factors in the Illinois Model (death of a peace 
officer, death of a witness in an investigation, and murder occurring at a 
correctional site) resulted in a death sentence in 100% of those circumstances.  
The other two factors (multiple victims and cruel/depraved manner of death) 
positively predict the odds of receiving a death sentence; defendants who killed 
multiple victims had four times the odds of receiving a death sentence than those 
who killed one victim, and those defendants who committed the murder in a cruel 
or depraved manner also had four time the odds of being sentenced to death by 
the jury. 
D. Examination of Arizona’s Most Found Statutory Aggravating Factors 
 Because the analyses rendered the Illinois Commission Model an 
appropriate predictor of receiving a death sentence in Maricopa County, it is 
valuable to determine if the five death-eligible factors the Commission 
recommends are appropriate to apply to Arizona‟s death penalty scheme.  Table 
10 and Figure 6 illustrate the frequency of statutory aggravating factors that were 
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found in the sample, with prior convictions and cruel murders being found in over 
half the cases.   
               Table 10. Aggravating Factors Found in Sample 
Agg. Factor Found A.R.S. § 13-751 N Cases Found138 
Prior conviction F(1) and F(2)139 24 (73%) 
Cruel/depraved manner F6 18 (55%) 
Murder at correctional 
facility 
F7 1 (.03%) 
Multiple victims F8 12 (36%) 
Murder of peace officer F10 2 (.06%) 
Murder of a witness F12 1 (.03%) 
                             
                          Figure 6.  Aggravating Factors Found 
 
Interestingly, this pattern is similar to that found in a study of most found 
aggravating factors by trial court judges from 1974-2000140, as evident in 
Appendix C.  Because the study was conducted prior to Ring v. Arizona141, which 
held that the trier of fact in capital cases must be a jury, rather than a judge, the 
                                                 
138
 While 34 defendants are included in the sample, 33 are included in analysis of the aggravating 
factors because in one case (Brian Black) the parties stipulated to life imprisonment prior to the 
aggravation phase of the trial. 
139
 F1 and F2 findings were combined into one aggravating factor for the purposes of this research. 
140
 Bortner, Peg and Andy Hall. 2001. Summary of Death Sentence Process: Data Set I Research 
Report to Arizona Capital Case Commission, Tempe, AZ: The Center for Urban Inquiry, College 
of Public Programs, Arizona State University. 
141
 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
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study reports the aggravating factors as found by the trial court judge.  The 
judge‟s findings are similar to the findings here, with a low rate of frequency for 
murders occurring at a correctional facility and the murder of a peace officer, 
although the judges in Bortner‟s study found the cruelty factor more often than 
the jury did in this sample.  While the Illinois Commission‟s recommendations 
are mostly representative of the aggravating factors in this sample that typically 
led to an outcome of death, it is recommended that the conviction of a serious 
prior offense be added as a sixth aggravating factor for the jury to consider.   
E. Measure of Egregiousness 
 To triangulate the findings of the Boolean and statistical analyses which 
suggest the most egregious cases in the sample do tend to result in a sentence of 
death, a version of Donohue‟s egregiousness measure is devised.  Table 11 
demonstrates a calculation of egregiousness for the sample, in which each 
aggravating factor is designated a score of 1, with the killing of an officer, a 
witness, or murder occurring at a correctional facility each designated a score of 
2.  These three factors are weighted because although they are not frequently 
found in the sample, when they are, they result in an outcome of death 100% of 
the time.  Accordingly, the highest possible score for those cases not including 
one of the three aforementioned factors is 4, and the highest possible score 
including the factors is 6. 
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             Table 11. Measure of Egregiousness 
DEFENDANT 
D
eath
 
2
+
V
C
T
M
S
 
P
R
IO
R
 
C
R
U
E
L
 
S
_
A
S
S
L
T
 
O
F
F
IC
E
R
 
W
T
N
S
S
 
JA
IL
 
E
G
R
E
G
 
HAUSNER 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 
LEHR 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 
DELAHANTY 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
GALLARDO 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
DIETEMAN 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
COTA 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
CALVILLO 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
SAUCEDA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
VANWINKLE 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 4 
PATTERSON 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
MEDINA 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
BOYSTON 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 
OVANTE, JR. 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
VASQUEZ 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
C. SERMENO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
JOSEPH 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
PARKER 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
ENRIQUEZ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
HENDERSON 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
FISH 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
A. SERMENO 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
FITZGERALD 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
BLAND 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
FICKLIN 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
GOMEZ 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
ROSE 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
HERNANDEZ 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 
BURNS 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
NARANJO 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 
REEVES 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MILLER 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 
BENSON 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
GOUDEAU 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
BLACK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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           Figure 7. Relationship Between Egregiousness and Sentence Outcome 
 
As Figure 7 shows, all cases receiving an egregiousness score of 3 or 4 resulted in 
a death sentence.  Of the remaining cases that resulted in a death sentence, 1 
received a score of 0142, 2 received a score of 1, and 6 received a score of 2.  In 
determining the relationship between race, egregiousness, and sentencing, Table 
12, presenting the low to mid-level egregiousness cases that received a death 
sentence, presents somewhat ambiguous conclusions.  In the one case with no 
egregiousness (a score of 0), the defendant was white and the victim was non-
white.  In the two low egregiousness cases (a score of 1), both cases involved 
non-white defendants and victims.  And as for the mid-range egregiousness cases 
(a score of 2) that received a death sentence, five of the seven cases involved a 
non-white defendant, with 2 of these involving a white victim.  When observing 
                                                 
142
 In the matter of Arizona v. Reeves, the jury found the F5 aggravating factor of committing the 
offense in consideration of pecuniary gain, which was not a factor included in the study because 
the author determined it not to be as significant a determination of egregiousness as the others 
included.  
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the race of the defendants for all low to mid-level egregiousness scores who 
received a death sentence, one notes that seven of the ten defendants are non-
white.  This seems to suggest that race plays a role in the low to mid-level 
egregiousness cases, with non-white defendants more likely to receive a death 
sentence than white defendants. 
                           Table 12. Relationship Between Low to Mid-Level Egregiousness and Race 
Defendant D_RACE V_RACE Score 
Reeves White Non-White 0 
Joseph Non-White Non-White 1 
Patterson 
Ovante, Jr. 
Non-White 
Non-White 
Non-White 
Non-White 
1 
2 
Gomez Non-White White 2 
Fitzgerald White White 2 
Parker White Non-White 2 
Medina Non-White White 2 
Cota Non-White Non-White 2 
Gallardo Non-White Non-White 2 
E. Summary of Results 
 Ultimately, a triangulated analysis of Maricopa County‟s capital 
sentencing outcomes from 2009 through 2011 reveals a disproportionate amount 
of non-white defendants receive the death penalty at the trial level (nearly twice 
as many), though the race of the victim is not shown to have an effect in the 
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sample.  Neither QCA nor a regression analysis of the Donohue model offer any 
support of Donohue‟s finding that non-white defendants whose victims are white 
are more likely to receive the death penalty.    
Though the Illinois Model was not appropriate to test with logistic 
regression due to the low number of relevant cases, the QCA results suggest that 
the Illinois Capital Commission‟s recommendation of the five specific death-
eligible factors does accurately list scenarios the jury finds most egregious, as 
evident in their sentencing.  The most frequently found aggravating factor in cases 
that resulted in a death sentence was having a prior serious conviction (82%), 
though this is not one of the factors the Commission suggests retaining. It is not 
explicitly stated, but the reason the Commission likely abandoned the prior 
conviction factor was to significantly reduce the pool of death-eligible homicides.  
The Commission does, however, consider a single-victim murder when the 
defendant has a prior murder conviction to constitute multiple murder.143 
Finally, testing of the Functional Model shows that the most egregious 
cases in the sample do result in a death sentence.  Both the Boolean and statistical 
methods support this finding, with prior convictions and multiple victims shown 
to be the most predictive of the sentencing outcome.  With regards to the 
relationship between egregiousness and race, application of an egregiousness 
calculation to the data also lends support to the Functional Model, while also 
unveiling a racialized component.  The most egregious cases, those that received 
                                                 
143 Supra note 24 at 70. 
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scores of 3 and 4, always received a sentence of death, no matter the defendant‟s 
race.  In low to mid-level egregiousness cases, though, the race of the defendant 
did seem to be significant, with more than twice as many non-white defendants 
receiving a death sentence than white defendants.  Indeed, this finding is 
supported by previous studies.  In his 2000 Washington Post article, Robert 
Blecker writes, “Capital punishment studies have consistently demonstrated that 
racial bias operates almost exclusively in these „mid-range‟ murder cases.”144  
And while John Donohue‟s findings as defined under the Donohue Model were 
not evident here, his finding that the “death penalty system results in disparate 
racial outcomes…that cannot be explained by the type of murder or the 
egregiousness and other aggravating factors of the crimes involved”145 does find 
support in this study of Maricopa County‟s death penalty scheme. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Conclusions 
 The search for the executable subject is necessitated by capital 
punishment.  In reserving execution for the worst of the worst, those defendants 
deemed death worthy must be identified.  The fact that the Constitution requires 
the death penalty to be imposed free from discrimination, yet study after study 
exposes race to be the ultimate predictor of those defendants that will receive it 
and those that don‟t, demands immediate attention.  Indeed, Donohue‟s charges of 
arbitrary and discriminatory implementation a real concern, especially in light of 
                                                 
144 Supra note 90. 
145 Supra  note 1, quoting at 7. 
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the fact that “today‟s incredibly shrinking death penalty”146 is faced with the fact 
that nearly 90% of all homicides today are death-eligible.147 
 There is a general consensus in the field that a drastic narrowing of those 
eligible for the death penalty must occur not only to reserve execution for “the 
most heinous of homicides”148, but to eliminate racism.  Some go so far as to say 
a narrowing requirement is “the only barrier to unfettered discretion.”149  Robert 
Blecker finds that “refining the aggravating circumstances in [mid-range] cases 
would undoubtedly make sentencing less arbitrary, and less prone to bias.”150  
Again, the narrowing requirement is reiterated by David Baldus, who argues that 
“the challenge to the system, then, is whether it can be modified to limit death 
sentencing to the worst offenders.  This goal might be achieved by drastically 
narrowing the categories of cases for which death sentences are authorized.”151  In 
this regard, the 2002 Illinois Capital Commission Report makes a 
recommendation of reducing states‟ aggravating factors list to five – down from 
the 15-20 that most states have on the books currently. 
 Troy Leon Gregg‟s assertion that “the state prosecutor has unfettered 
authority to select those persons whom he wishes to prosecute for a capital 
offense and plea bargain with them”152 was damning enough to elicit a sharp 
rebuke from Justice White.  It assumes, of course, a level of transparency in plea 
                                                 
146 Supra note 50. 
147 Supra note 57. 
148 Supra note 60. 
149 Supra note 62. 
150 Supra note 90. 
151 Supra note 8, quoting at 3. 
152 Supra note 65. 
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bargaining that does not exist – certainly not in Maricopa County, anyway.  The 
fact that “plea bargaining is hidden from public view”153 in light of the fact that 
prosecutors maintain extreme discretion over charging and plea bargaining 
decisions is, or should be, criminal.  Until plea bargaining is upheld by transparent 
procedural guidelines by prosecutors, including a mandate against pleas for the 
most egregious crimes, plea bargaining in capital cases will continue to devalue 
and pervert the death penalty.   
 One of the most problematic issues in capital punishment, though was not 
explored in this thesis, is funding for defense counsel.  The title of one of the most 
extensive articles in the area says it all; Stephen Bright‟s Counsel for the Poor: 
The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer.  Bright 
explains that “arbitrary results, which are all too common in death penalty cases, 
frequently stem from inadequacy of counsel.”154  Bright goes to argue that, “In 
consequence, a large part of the death row population is made up of people who 
are distinguished by neither their records nor the circumstances of their crimes, 
but by their abject poverty, debilitating mental impairments, minimal intelligence, 
and the poor legal representation they received.”155  Until defense counsel is 
provided equal funding as prosecutor‟s offices to pay for investigation, experts, 
                                                 
153 Supra  note 67. 
154
 Bright, Stephen B. 1994. Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime 
but for the Worst Lawyer. The Yale Law Journal, 103, 1835-1883, quoting at 1837. 
155
 Id., quoting at 1840. 
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and qualified counsel, the “increasingly pernicious visegrip”156 for the indigent 
facing capital charges will remain. 
 Justice Stewart‟s opinion in Furman that “these death sentences are cruel 
and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual” 
led to the holding that the death penalty, as applied then, was unconstitutional.  
Today, the question remains: Is getting the death penalty like getting struck by 
lightning?  The results from this study, and from the majority of extant literature, 
indicate that if you‟re white, the answer is yes.  The outcome is a little more 
predictable if you‟re not. 
B. Limitations 
 While this thesis has afforded some contributable findings to the field, and 
especially in regard to capital punishment specific to Maricopa County, a number 
of limitations exist.  One of the primary limitations of the work is the small 
sample size.  Though it covers three years worth of capital case sentencing in 
Maricopa County, it is not as near ambitious as Donohue‟s Connecticut study 
which covered 34 years and followed the cases from indictment to execution.  
Funding and time restraints confounded the researcher‟s ability to delve deeper, 
and the findings may have been different with an expanded population of cases.   
Another major limitation of this thesis was the confinement of analysis to 
trial-level outcomes.  The infrequency of execution compared to the nearly 90% 
                                                 
156 Marshall, Thurgood. 1986. Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at the Judicial Conference of 
the Second Circuit. Columbia Law Review, 86.1, 1-8, quoting at 2. 
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of death-eligible murders highlights this limitation.  Although the jury may 
sentence the defendant to death, this sentence can be reversed at any time in the 
direct appeal, post-conviction relief, or habeas corpus phases of the case.  Also, 
assessing and making conclusions based off of trial-level sentencing does not 
account for any errors that may be corrected in the later phases. 
C. Future Research 
 Future research that is desperately needed is replications of Donohue‟s 
Connecticut study nationwide.  Only a complete, longitudinal examination in each 
state that has the death penalty, from indictment to execution, will truly be able to 
assess the current state of capital punishment in terms of Gregg‟s requirement of 
justice.  In Maricopa County, research that uses this thesis as a starting point 
should widen the net of cases for analysis, and follow the case outcomes through 
the appeals process.  Another recommendation is for an examination into the plea 
bargaining of Maricopa County‟s plea bargaining procedures, as they were well 
hidden from the researcher.  Finally, because one of the only ways to free, or at 
least significantly distance, capital punishment from capricious and 
discriminatory sentencing is to drastically reduce death-eligibility factors, it is 
essential that work be done in an effort to test and implement this reworking 
nationwide to ensure the death penalty is reserved for the worst of the worst.  
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